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China: Think Tanks in Military Policy Formulation (U)

A Defense Research Assessment



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China: Think Tanks in Military Policy Formulation (U)

A Defense Research Assessment

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China: Think Tanks in Military Policy Formulation (U)

KEY JUDGMENTS

■ Think tanks are becoming more prominent in China's various policymaking arenas. Some are born of well-established academic research centers and universities, but many have been created as wholly new entities to serve specific research needs. Today, a plethora of such groups exists in China, addressing every issue from agriculture to international relations. Some of these affect military policy at various levels. The development of such groups is best understood in the context of several factors:

- China's increasingly active role in global affairs requires a more energetic use of intellectual resources in planning and policy decisions.
- Currently, such resources reside predominantly in research organizations, commonly called "think tanks," attached to the government or to academic institutions.
- Chinese think tanks, in their present form, are a new phenomenon. They are increasingly involved in policy formulation. At least four are involved directly in the development of military priorities and policies.
- Think tanks focusing on military-related research frequently are tied to intelligence and security organizations.
- The role and influence of these organizations can be substantial, but often depend more on the personal affiliations of the individuals involved than on institutional reputation.
- A key development among these institutes is increased communication between organizations doing complementary research and a willingness to hold discussions with foreign counterparts.
- Think tanks clearly have a growing opportunity and ability to influence policymaking in China. The extent to which they actually do, in the context of China's domestic political environment, remains unclear. Although they play an active role in the decisionmaking process, they remain a step or two removed from the final decision.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background	1
Sources of Military Policy	1
Major Military Policy Research Institutes	6
Other Institutes That Contribute to Military Policy	13
Conclusions	13

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(U) "Since World War II, many brain trusts and think tanks have appeared in foreign countries. Acting as the outer brains of the policymakers, they help the latter ponder and study questions. This is beneficial to the drafting of strategies and can help reduce and avoid mistakes in making policy decisions."

—Yang Dezhi
Chief, PLA General Staff Department
March 1986

China: Think Tanks in Military Policy Formulation (U)

Background

(U) The Chinese leadership recognizes the need for a reliable pool of talented, strategic thinkers to assess and evaluate the future direction of China's political-military philosophy, to study China's changing role in global affairs, to review its stand on current issues, and to lend research support for policy planning. Until recently, China's top decisionmakers operated largely in a narrow environment. Complex political-military problems, present and future, seldom received the systematic, extensive investigation that is routine in the West. New situations were met as they arose, with decisions made primarily on personal exposure and immediate circumstances. In the process, key decisions were made on the basis of individual experiences and biases and not on thorough analysis. This situation was aggravated by the trauma of the Cultural Revolution, which destroyed initiative, closed universities and research institutes, and discouraged most forms of intellectual activity.

(U) A renewed recognition of the importance of its intellectual resources is a key development in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution. China's leaders increasingly rely on the expert knowledge and insight of China's brightest minds. Academic credentials have become a major criteria for promotion throughout China's workforce.

(U) To meet the growing demand for the technical analyses required to support China's diverse reform and modernization efforts, research institutes and advisory groups have been established or expanded to identify, study, and suggest options to resolve issues pertinent to policy

debate and implementation.¹ Such groups are instrumental in formulating development strategies, in submitting research results for issue resolution, and in drafting statements to articulate policy decisions.

(U) Research groups have been organized to address most policy areas. Municipal and provincial governments have set up think tanks to assess the effects on local functions of national-level decisions and to devise programs for implementation.² This indicates an increase in collaboration and delegation among the leaders and a larger role for advisory research groups involved in collecting, analyzing, and reporting critical information.

Sources of Military Policy

(U) China's military leaders similarly recognize the value of drawing on a "brain trust" for policy guidance and have established research facilities to stimulate thinking on strategy and tactics, force structure, combat support, military education, combined arms operations, and other military subjects. In addition, the separate branches of the PLA also are developing research groups to study problems peculiar to their service.

(U) There are many organizations in China which are defense-related, including those involved in research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) of specific technology-related subjects such as weapon systems and effects, communications equipment, computers, and a host of other such detailed scientific pursuits for military and civilian application. Other institutes which have direct input to national-level decisionmakers research foreign relations and inter-

¹ (U) Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, extensive reforms have been set in motion throughout Chinese society. These reforms focus on economic policies, foreign relations, domestic administration, military strategy and doctrine, and education.

² (U) In this paper, "think tank" refers to any organization preparing finished studies based on research and analysis of collected information for the consumption of policymakers.



The Cultural Revolution.

China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution combined high-level political struggle, ideological fervor, mass fanaticism, and military intervention to create a tumultuous national paroxysm. In the course of only a few years, it shredded the fabric of a popular socialist revolution that had been in process for more than half a century.


Often called "the decade of turmoil" by the Chinese, the Cultural Revolution's chaotic peak spanned 3 years, from 1966 to 1969. However, the seeds of the Cultural Revolution were sown in the fall of 1962, when Mao Zedong proclaimed a need for revival of class struggle. Escalation of the Vietnam War in 1964 exacerbated internal Chinese leadership differences concerning external threats and the approach to take toward the two superpowers.

In 1966 a series of events revealed critical factionalism in the central leadership. Mao summoned his political resources, including his personal charisma, to mobilize millions of young students — the Red Guards — to saturate the country with dogmatic ideological fervency and eliminate bourgeois "contaminants" such as art, literature, philosophy, religion, and intellectualism. Historical relics were destroyed. Art collections were demolished. Temples, churches, libraries, and whole universities were closed down.

After almost a year of unrestricted, abusive destruction of public and private property by the Red Guards, the military was called upon to restore order. By the summer of 1969, all Red Guard units were disbanded and the youth were dispersed throughout the country. In the process, the military gained significant power in the central leadership.

The devastating effects of the Cultural Revolution carried over until well after Mao's death in 1976. Most of the leaders purged during the Cultural Revolution did not regain authority until after Mao died, and the military remained a powerful force in domestic politics. Many of the changes in government, education, industry, and other sectors, brought about during the Cultural Revolution, remained in place until the late 1970s. Even today, its consequences are visible in the hesitancy of many Chinese to trust new policies which allow them greater freedom. Schools and research institutes have been reopened, and a new generation of technocrats is being assembled and trained to cope with China's backwardness and to usher China into the modern world.

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(U) *Research Institute Subordination.*

national security issues like nuclear proliferation and arms control and disarmament which are related to military priorities and policies.³ There are four major institutes (three military and one civilian) which contribute significantly and directly to the formulation of military policies affecting force structure, strategic doctrine, and defense modernization: the National Defense University, the Academy of Military Sciences, the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

(U) In Beijing, policy formulation relies extensively on behind-the-scenes forces and on individuals and their respective institutional connections. For example, prior to implementation of military command reorganization and mil-

itary education reforms, many articles appeared in China's press describing the types of changes needed in the military system. The appearance of such articles traditionally has been an indicator of debate within the Chinese leadership. Not long after these items appeared, the proposed changes were announced as policy.

■ China's key military policymaking body is the Central Military Commission of the Party Central Committee, which exercises centralized control over the PLA. There actually are two Military Commissions, one in the party hierarchy and one in the state hierarchy. Although each is intended to exercise slightly different responsibilities, to date, the two have continued to have the same Chairman and the same basic membership. The

³ ■ For an assessment of Chinese views on these types of topics, see *China: Views on Nuclear Arms Control (U)*, DDB-2210-3-86 forthcoming.



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The International Studies Research Center.

When China's top leadership requires information on specific issues, it frequently directs requests to the International Studies Research Center (ISRC), a high-level information conduit which reports directly to the State Council. In some cases, ISRC analysts may conduct the basic research, analysis, and reporting. Often, however, ISRC requests assistance from other organizations. Once complete, the report is submitted through ISRC for review before delivery to the individual or office who requested the study.

Part of the Center's daily responsibility is preparation of a summary of current events for the consumption of the leadership. It also screens reports from diverse sources and, as appropriate, forwards them with a personal memo from the Center's influential First Secretary, Huan Xiang.

Huan is a greatly respected policy adviser. He has been a prime mover in China's foreign policy arena for several years and has worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since before liberation. Also, Huan was China's Charge in London (1954-62) and Ambassador in Brussels (1976-78).

Huan is a prolific commentator on a broad scope of international problems but is most noted for his works on economics and foreign policy. He also has written about international relations, security, and strategic issues. A collection of 31 of his articles recently was published in Beijing. He has traveled to the United States many times, most recently in March 1986.

Party Military Commission (CMC) has final authority within the military over policy direction and goals. The State Military Commission (MC) bears the legal power to exercise administrative authority over the proper implementation by affected government entities of central military directives.


CK The Ministry of National Defense (MND) retains nominal control over the military scientific and technological establishment, a responsibility which is becoming increasingly significant. The MND has no command authority over the PLA. Its role is strictly administrative. The key function of the MND is to provide ministerial-level representation of the military in the state hierarchy and to legitimize use of state resources for defense purposes.

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<u>PARTY</u>	<u>STATE</u>
Chairman: Deng Xiaoping	Chairman: Deng Xiaoping
Vice Chairman: Xu Xiangqian Nie Rongzhen	Vice Chairman: Xu Xiangqian Nie Rongzhen Yang Shangkun
Executive Vice Chairman: Yang Shangkun	Members: Yu Qiuli Yang Dezhi Zhang Aiping Hong Xuezhi
Secretary-General: Yang Shangkun	
Deputy Secretaries-General: Yu Qiuli Yang Dezhi Zhang Aiping Hong Xuezhi	

(U) Military Commissions Membership.

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(U) Military Chain of Command.

As indicated in the graphic of China's military chain-of-command, the CMC makes its decisions based on reports received from the General Departments of the PLA and on research reports from the various institutes. The source of information depends on the issue. Daily/routine operational decisions mostly are made according to the reported needs of the unit. For strategic, long term, and broad impact policy decisions such as R&D, weapons acquisition and allocation, and strategy and doctrine, specific research organizations are tasked.

The main sources for this second type of input are military schools and academies, and

research organs attached to various components of China's expanding defense industrial complex. Two academic institutes directly subordinate to the CMC have been active in researching strategic issues: the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) and the PLA Military Academy (PLAMA). These two institutes now are being transformed to become more responsive to the leadership's strategic research needs and to enhance research efforts.

The PLAMA has merged with the Logistics and Political Academies to create China's new National Defense University (NDU). The AMS has new leadership and has redefined its research

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and support objectives. The AMS and the PLAMA have made significant contributions to the development of military priorities and policies. They will continue to do so, probably more efficiently than ever.

(U) Another military think tank, the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, also has access to military policymakers, and is the vehicle by which the Chinese military interacts with foreign military representatives to exchange views on broad strategic issues. In addition, one of the major civilian research organizations, the Academy of Social Sciences, has been instrumental in the development of China's newer military strategic research centers and contributes to military policy formulation.

(U) Besides these formally organized institutes, periodic collateral conferences are being held to promote communication between researchers from different organizations. A national defense symposium, recently convened in Beijing, was at least the second of its size and scope held within the past year. Representatives of operational, research, and policy-level components attended. According to official Chinese news releases, the purpose was "to provide sufficient opinions for use by the Central Military Commission as a basis and reference for studying and establishing...China's national defense strategy."


Major Military Policy Research Institutes

(U) There are several research institutes which contribute in some way to China's military policy process. Of particular relevance are four major institutes at the summit of national-level military policy research: the newly established National Defense University, the longstanding Academy of Military Science, the amorphous Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, and the trailblazing Academy of Social Sciences.

National Defense University (NDU)

(U) The National Defense University (NDU) was founded in December 1985 and began its first academic year on 1 September 1986. The NDU merges the PLA's Political, Logistics, and

Military Academies. It trains senior commanders at and above the army level, senior staff officers at and above military region level, and senior theoretical researchers. The student body also includes civilian government and party officials from national, provincial, and municipal levels.



(U) National Defense University Key Personnel Organizational Structure.

(U) One of the primary goals of the NDU is to encourage the exchange of ideas between military and civilian officials. This is a unique proposition in China, where the division between these two groups traditionally has stifled objectivity and cultivated parochialism. This type of exchange could promote an expanded perspective and provide a sound base for the growth of strategic

thinking in the Chinese military. Senior officers will receive broad, comprehensive training which will emphasize the special needs and responsibilities of a modern military force.

■ In another unprecedented development, foreign military leaders and academics are being invited to give lectures and lead seminars at the University. The primary purpose of these exchanges is to familiarize Chinese officers with foreign military concepts, organizational structures, and procedures firsthand.

■ The University is organized into four functional departments: the Administration, Political, Scientific Research, and Training Departments. There also is a headquarters office and three levels of faculty (basic, advanced, and national

defense research), plus a post-graduate school and a teacher training center. Under the Scientific Research Department are the Marxism, Strategy, and Army-Building Research Institutes. The sub-sections of the Training and Political Departments are not known.

(U) The Strategy Research Institute under the Scientific Research Department is the rebirth of the PLA Military Academy's Institute for Strategic Studies. The latter was formed in early 1985 with the explicit purpose of bridging the gap between military and civilian strategists. It was the brainchild of Xiao Ke, then Commandant of the Military Academy, and was developed with much assistance from Zhang Jingyi, a retired military officer, former Academy strategy instructor, and CASS researcher who has extensive connec-

In the 1950s, when the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) and the PLA Military Academy (PLAMA) were founded, they had different training and research objectives. The PLAMA was to provide advanced command training in strategy and tactics for senior military leaders. The AMS was concerned more with the planning and development of military theory, examining especially the application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought to Chinese military strategy. In these roles the AMS had a stronger voice in military policy formulation as an authority on strategy and doctrine, whereas the PLAMA's role was confined to training.

The traumatic intervention of the Cultural Revolution caused the PLAMA to be inactive from 1970 to 1978. The AMS was not closed, but the Cultural Revolution affected the AMS's potency as a source of high-level strategic advice.

During the 1970s and early 1980s, the AMS retained a very conservative attitude toward military strategy and defense modernization. The AMS presented the opinion that the thoughts of Mao were sufficient to sustain the Chinese military and modernization should be attempted only very gradually, if at all, and with no interference from outsiders. This hard line was not received favorably by many of China's senior leaders, particularly the leaders who came to power after Mao's death in 1976.

The PLAMA was reestablished in 1978 with Xiao Ke as the Commandant. Xiao had a reputation as a veteran commander, a seasoned academic, and an incisive strategic thinker, and he had close connections with the emerging post-Mao political leadership. His ideas about military modernization and its effects on strategy and doctrine were endorsed by several key leaders, including Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang.

The ensuing rivalry between the PLAMA and the AMS resulted in significant loss of influence for the AMS and a corresponding increase in influence for the PLAMA. By 1981, the PLAMA clearly was the leader in strategy and doctrine research and development, and it was a key source of information and advice for military decisionmakers.

In the last 5 years, as the AMS struggled to maintain some voice in military policy, it declined until it was virtually a superfluity in China's military education system. Furthermore, the newly formed National Defense University includes a Strategic Research Institute, which has led to some speculation that the AMS might be discarded in favor of the new organization. However, reports as recent as late August 1986 indicate the AMS is being revitalized under new leadership and is expected to reestablish its role in China's military strategy research community.

Academic Rivalry.

tions with several strategic institutes in the US and West Europe. In its current incarnation, the Strategy Research Institute (also still referred to as the ISS) is concerned with national security policy and defense modernization issues.

The NDU's emphasis on research indicates recognition of its anticipated impact on policy direction and development. A State Council Bulletin states the major task of the Research Department is "to study and research the strategic issues related to the construction of China's national defense... (and)... to enable military and civilian cadres to jointly discuss major issues... and enhance their capability of making macroscopic policy decisions."


Academy of Military Sciences (AMS)

The Academy of Military Sciences was established in 1958 to provide a forum for PLA members to study military thought and history. The AMS is under the direct leadership of the Central Military Commission. According to its charter, "it systemically conducts research in military sciences through which a modernized and regularized revolutionary army may be speedily established."

This Academy exists outside China's regular military education hierarchy.⁴ Its purpose is not professional military education, but research and development of military strategy and doctrine. In the past, the results of these efforts have been applied to the development of China's strategic policies.

AMS was the only high-level military institute that continued to operate during the Cultural Revolution. It received much criticism during that period, however, and the resulting inertia continued to impede meaningful research in subsequent years. Therefore, its influence and utility for the PLA dissipated, leaving a critical gap in military policy research at a crucial time in the PLA's development. The PLA Military Academy,

under the leadership of Xiao Ke (see appendix A), contributed to filling that gap.



(U) Academy of Military Sciences Key Personnel and Organizational Structure.

With China's extensive military reorganizations, including the creation of the new National Defense University, the AMS is being revitalized. It has a new commander, Zheng Wenhan, and a new charter from the Central Military Commission.

(U) A conference was held at the AMS in June 1986 to redefine the Academy's goals. The result was an updated statement of the objectives of military research. These included intensifying "lateral ties with other departments and carrying out research openly," "setting up ties with relevant foreign military units and academic organizations," "providing strategic proposals and consultation for the Central Military Commissions and various PLA headquarters," using computer simulations to study "tactical issues," and "fostering academic democracy, enlivening academic thinking, giving researchers greater initiative in doing their work,


⁴ (U) The AMS does not fit in the three-tiered system which includes basic, intermediate, and senior military schools for corresponding levels of officers. For a full explanation of China's military officer education system see *China: PLA Officer Education* (U), DJS-2600-5264-86, February 1986.

and encouraging them to achieve greater, faster, and better results."

If the AMS can reestablish its usefulness in the PLA's modernization efforts, it may once again become a central institute in the evolution of China's military theory. Certainly, current efforts serve that objective. In the future, the AMS, in conjunction with the NDU, likely will be at the apex of China's national defense strategy research community.

Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS)

(U) The Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS) is China's newest military think tank. It was established in 1979 as a military complement to existing civilian international studies research institutes. Its constitutionally stated purpose is "to study strategic questions in relation to national security and world peace and to develop academic exchange with strategic research establishments, organizations, and academics abroad."



(U) BIISS Key Personnel and Organizational Structure.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of BIISS appear to be advisory positions. The Vice Chairman, however, seems to exert decisionmaking power. The Secretary-General handles daily functions and usually acts as the host to visitors. There also is an Executive Council which serves as an intermediary for research guidance between the Vice Chairman and the research staff.

(U) BIISS's research staff is organized according to geographic areas of responsibility. There also is a "general affairs" section that addresses supra-geographic issues such as SDI, arms control and disarmament, and nuclear proliferation.

NO

NO

NO

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⁵ (U) Biographic notes in appendix A include individual assessments of pro-US attitudes.

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the oldest and largest of China's active scientific research institutes. CASS was formed in 1977 to perform functions previously assigned to the Division of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the CAS. The primary purpose for creating CASS was to expand social science research significantly without compounding CAS's administrative burden. CASS's formation also has allowed more independence of research and has shortened the organizational chain permitting greater responsiveness to a wider range of requirements. CASS has a policy advisory role and provides position papers on a multitude of topics for senior party, state, and military leaders.

(U) Before the creation of CASS, the Philosophy and Social Sciences Division of the CAS consisted of 13 functional institutes. Today, CASS has 32 institutes which employ well over 5,000 people including administrative staff, researchers, editors, engineers, technicians, and translators.⁷ Research analysts make up more than half of the total number.


The various institutes under CASS produce classified or "internal distribution" research papers on current international and domestic issues for top party and state leaders. Some also are published in restricted journals and occasionally in open source periodicals and newspapers. These articles educate consumers about social and political theories that impact on policy formulation. While such articles are often encumbered with party rhetoric, they increasingly represent carefully researched positions.

Since its research addresses international security issues, CASS has an indirect influence on military policy formulation. Although their analysis is broad, it could affect the structure and development of the PLA. Research topics such as those concerning "The Soviet Threat in Northeast

6 While reforms such as structural reorganization, combined arms operations, and even reductions in force, eventually will result in improved capabilities, this process is relatively long-term and in the meantime China's defense forces remain comparatively weak. For further details see *China: Military Reform Campaign* (U), DIAPPR 61-85, 3 October 1985, [redacted]; *China: Military Region Reorganization* (U), DDB-2600-4868-85-SI, June 1985, [redacted] and *PRC Force Developments: Semiannual Status Report* (U), DDB-2680-22-86, forthcoming.

⁷ (U) Local academies of social sciences exist in the provinces and boast a total of 190 research departments employing about 4,200 researchers. However, these academies are autonomous and are funded by the respective local governments.

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(U) Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Key Personnel and Organizational Structure.

Asia" and "Pacific Basin Security" clearly impact on the direction, scope, and tone of China's defense modernization program.

■ One of the CASS institutes most involved in strategic research is the Institute of American Studies (IAS). IAS was established in 1981 as a response to the normalization of Sino-American relations and has four research divisions: Economy, Politics, Strategy and Foreign Affairs, and Society and Culture. The institute employs about 60 personnel, including approximately 35 researchers, with the balance as library and administrative staff. It had a significant role in the establishment of the PLA's Institute of Strategic Studies.

■ Other institutes under CASS also are concerned with international problems which bear indirectly on the development of national defense strategies. These include separate studies institutes devoted to world economics and politics, Japan, the Soviet Union and East Europe, West Europe, West Asia and Africa, Latin America, and South Asia. These sections deal mostly with foreign affairs issues; however, in that context, bilateral military relations and military technology cooperation are addressed.

Other Institutes That Contribute to Military Policy

(U) The four institutes just discussed are not the only research institutes which have influence, direct or indirect, on military policy formulation. Many others have input to decisionmakers, but do not deal routinely with specific military policy issues. Nonetheless, research on foreign affairs and international security relate indirectly to military priorities, and institutes which concentrate on these topics do have some influence on military policy.

(U) Three such institutes are especially worthy of note because of the scope of their research, the extent and level of their influence, and their impact on the development of military research institutes:

- The Institute of Contemporary International Relations is China's largest international studies research institute. It reports to the State Council through the ISRC, but is administratively subordinate to the Ministry of State Security. Its research efforts probably have the widest impact among China's foreign affairs policymakers.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its own Institute of International Studies which does strictly foreign relations research. Its studies often address security and strategic issues. For instance, it has been very active in preparing input for China's assessment of the Strategic Defense Initiative.⁸
- The Shanghai Institute of International Strategic Studies, subordinate to the Shanghai municipality, often is tasked from Beijing to prepare analyses on various topics, including international security and foreign relations issues which bear on military developments.

(U) These institutes, and others like them, broke the ground for China's newer military think tanks, and provided a model for reorganizing those established earlier. In relative terms, the older civilian institutes have greater influence on the leadership than do their younger military counterparts. However, the four institutes detailed in this study have the most direct input to the Military Commissions in support of explicit military-related decisions.

Conclusions

(U) China's active role in international affairs requires the effective use of thorough analysis from intellectuals to assist in planning and policy decisions. The creation and growth in the number of think tanks in China suggest China's leadership continues to build on the concept of "collegial decisionmaking" using all the skills, experience, and knowledge available rather than relying on the judgment of a small group of individuals. Nevertheless, despite this greater awareness and

⁸ (U) When China's Premier, Zhao Ziyang, requested information on SDI, virtually every research institute in China devoted resources to it.

willingness to draw upon a broad, varied stream of information, actual decisions on important issues continue to be made by a relatively small group of leaders.

(U) Today, research institutes increasingly are called upon to provide assessments and judgments that influence policy formulation in China. The degree of influence varies and depends on individual personalities and the credibility and prestige of a particular institute.

(U) One of the most significant issues requiring comprehensive research involves military and security policies and procedures. Think tanks focusing on these types of questions are a fairly recent development. Many of their reports go directly to the Central Military Commission or the State Council.

working groups on specific fields of continuing interest. This type of colloquy heralds a new effort to promote open exchange among strategic thinkers, planners, and implementers.

(U) Interchange among analysts from different research organizations now is being encouraged, although evidence indicates limited coordination between think tanks is the norm. In some cases, analytic cooperation even within a single institute still is limited, perhaps by the competitive spirit of the individuals. Increasingly, however, communication is being encouraged as analysts begin to appreciate the benefits of sharing information and collaborating on research.

(U) Conferences are being held to discuss topics of immediate concern to China's military. Many are limited to smaller attendance and are less formal in nature. These meetings function as ad hoc

Appendix B

Yes

Chronology of BISS Exchanges

Date	Name/Position of Head of Delegation	To/From
Aug 80	Mr. Bartholomew, State Dept, Director, Pol/Mil Bureau	to China
Oct 81	John Lewis, Stanford University	to China
Dec 81	Xu Xin, V. Pres, BISS	to Guinea
Jul 82	Jiang Youshu, (former) Secretary-General, BISS	to US
Aug 82	Xu Xin, V. Pres, BISS	to Africa (Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe)
Aug 83	Melvin Price, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee	to China
Sep 83	Caspar Weinberger, SecDef	to China
Mar 84	Brent Scowcroft, former US Asst to the President for Nat'l Security Affairs as Chairman, President's Commission on Strategic Forces	to China
Oct 84	Xu Xin, V. Pres, BISS	to Sweden
Oct 84	John Lewis, Dir, Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control	to China
Nov 84	Alexander Haig, former SecState as consultant for Sikorsky	to China
Nov 84	Christopher Dodd, US Senator	to China
Mar 85	G. Kamoff-Nicolsky, Dir, Canada's ORAE	to China
Apr 85	Wu Xiuquan, President, BISS	to Japan
Apr 85	VAdm Maurice Poisson, Chilean Navy	to China
May 85	C. T. Wu, Prof, Hunter College of City University of New York	to China
Aug 85	Robert Komer, former Under SecDef	to China
Sep 85	Robert Long, Adm, USN (Ret)	to China
Oct 85	Georgiy Arbatov and Vladimir Petrovich, Institute of US and Canada Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union	to China
Oct 85	Xu Xin, V. Pres, BISS	to US
Nov 85	Paul Wolfowitz, Asst SecState, EA&P	to China
Jan 86	John Holdern, Chairman, American Federation of Scientists	to China
Feb 86	William Schneider, Under SecState fo Security Assistance, Science and Technology	to Chin

Appendix B (Continued)

Yes

Date	Name/Position of Head of Delegation	To/From
Mar 86	Xiong Guangkai, Exec Council member, BISS	to US
May 86	Xu Xin, VPres, BISS	to Japan
Jun 86	Bedrettin Demirel, Turkish General	to China

Many other meetings with BISS officials and staff members have occurred under less publicized circumstances, and BISS members often travel with Chinese military delegations even when the main purpose of the travel is not related directly to their BISS assignment.

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(U) The author acknowledges the contribution of [REDACTED] formerly of the US National Defense University, and [REDACTED]

(U) Each classified title and heading has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

(U) This study was coordinated with the Directorates for Estimates and Current Intelligence.

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